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This paper presents a model of informal care to parents. We assume that the child 
participates in the labour market and gains in utility from consumption and leisure. In 
addition it has altruistic motivation to give informal care to its elderly parent. We show 
how the labour income, labour supply and informal caregiving are affected by exogenous 
factors such as the education level, wage rate, other supply of care, travel distance and 
inheritance. 
 
  11. Introduction 
In the next decades, most countries in the world, including Norway, will face a 
demographic change as the share of elderly people in the population will rise. Based on 
this, the governments face several challenges. First, the development will likely impose 
large fiscal strains on future workers in order to finance an increasingly overstretched 
public sector. Further, the need for employees in the health sector as well as the long-
term care sector will also be higher as the demand for health and care services increases 
in the share of elderly people. Due to constraints on public finance, future workers may 
also come under stronger domestic pressure, e.g., in the form of care-needing relatives 
and friends. Thus, there is a demand for them to work longer as well as to supply 
informal care to parents, relatives and friends. Will it be possible to combine work with 
informal care giving, or will the supply of informal care substitute for labour market 
activity?  
 
In this paper we present a model of informal labour supply to parents. The paper is a 
companion paper to our analysis in Fevang et al. (2008), where we study empirically the 
effects on grown up children’s labour market behaviour of having a lone parent in the 
terminal phase of life. The model is formulated in a flexible way to be able to analyse 
many of the factors that have an effect of labour market outcomes and that are studied in 
the empirical analysis. Also, the comparative statics provided below are based on the 
variables available in the data. 
 
The theoretical literature emphasises several motives for a grown up child to provide care 
to its elderly parents (see, e.g., Giménez et al., 2007). Some examples are altruism, duty, 
social norms, reciprocity, exchange (money transfers as payment for services provided by 
children), loan transfers, strategic bequest motives and a demonstration effect (the care 
giver wants to affect the habits or norms of their children as a mean to receive future 
care). The bulk of the literature, however, focuses on altruism and exchange. In an 
altruistic model, the child takes the utility function of the parent into account when 
determining its behaviour. Some examples of this are found in Chang and White-Means 
  2(1995), Nocera and Zweifel (1996) and Kuhn and Nuscheler (2007). In our model we 
assume altruism to be the motivation behind caregiving. 
 
Below we present the model of informal labour supply to parents. We assume that the 
child participates in the labour market and gains in utility from consumption and leisure. 
But it also has altruistic motivation to give informal care to its elderly parent. We show 
how labour income, labour supply and informal caregiving are affected by exogenous 
factors such as the education level, wage rate, other supply of care, travel distance and 
inheritance. We also refer to Fevang et al. (2008) for a shorter presentation of the model. 
 
2. The basic model  
We consider a model for supply of informal care, where the recipient of informal care is 
not in the household of the caregiver. Thus, the disability of the recipient will not directly 
affect household income or household production of the caregiver (see, e.g., Ahlburg and 
Chi, 2006, for a model on supply of informal care within the household). We name the 
caregiver as child and the recipient as parent. 
 
The parent is living alone and in need of care in the period before death. Care is partly 
provided by the child (informal care) and partly by others. The latter can be informal 
care, public care or market care. We assume that other care is independent of the 
caregiving of the child. This can be thought of as if the parent has only one child
1 (as in 
Kuhn and Nuscheler, 2007) and/or that other care is only formal care (public or private). 
 
We focus on three periods where the initial period (t=0) is the period when the parent is 
healthy and not in need of any care. Period 1 (t=1) is the period before the death of the 
parent, and where she is in need of care. The final period (t=2) is the period after death, 
and the child provides no caregiving. 
                                                 
1 We could assume that other care is care provided by siblings. However, there may be a game between 
siblings as one child can free ride on the care provided by other children. Several papers have studied the 
interactions or strategic behaviour of siblings when the parent’s health is considered a common good, see, 
e.g., Konrad et al. (2002), Engers and Stern (2002), Rainer and Siedler (2005) and Callegaro and Pasini 
(2007). Also, empirical studies find that a child provides less care to its parent when it has siblings, see, 
e.g., Romøren (2003). 
  3 
The utility function of the child at time t=1 is given by: 
 
(1) U1 = v(C1) + βV(N) 
 
Where v is a concave function in total consumption denoted as C. As in Kuhn and 
Nuscheler (2007), we assume that the child cares about the wellbeing of its parent, and 
that this is presented as an additive altruistic term where β in general lies between 0 and 
1. V is the utility function of the parent, which is concave in the total amount of care 
denoted by N (V’ >0 and V’’<0). 
 
At time t=0 and t=2, the parent is either not in need of care or has deceased, and the 
utility function of the child is dependent on total consumption only: 
 
(2) Ut = v(Ct), t=0,2 
 
Total consumption is assumed to be a household production function of consumed goods, 
X, and leisure, L, where C´X >0, C´´XX <0, C´L >0, C´´LL <0. In addition, we follow the 
standard human capital approach and assume that education, E, changes the productivity 
of time and goods positively in producing total consumption (see, e.g., Michael, 1973), 
i.e., C´´XE >0 and C´´LE >0: 
 
(3) Ct = C(Xt,Lt;E) 
 
The utility of consumption can be written in the following way: 
 
(4) u(Xt,Lt;E) = v(C(Xt,Lt;E)) 
 
We then find uX > 0, uXX < 0, uL > 0 and uLL < 0, and assume uXE > 0, uLE > 0, uXL > 0.
2 
                                                 
2 We find uX = vCCX > 0, uXX = vCCCX + vCCXX < 0 , uXE = vCCCECX+ vCCXE, uL = vLCL > 0, uLL = vLLCL + 
vLCLL < 0 , uLE = vCCCECL + vCCLE and uXL = vCCCXCL + vCCXL. 
  4 
Thus, we can rewrite equations (1) and (2) as follows: 
 
(5) U0 = u(X0,L0;E) 
(6) U1 = u(X1,L1;E) + βV(N) 
(7) U2 = u(X2,L2;E) 
 
The level of care received by the parent is the sum of informal care supplied by the child, 
Z, and other care, Z :
3 
 
(8) N = Z +Z  
 
 Tt is the total time available for work, leisure and caregiving at time t. This can be 
thought of as healthy time, i.e., time not being sick. Time can be spent on three activities; 
work (or labour supply - LS), leisure and caregiving. Further, a is the time travel cost 
related to giving care. Thus, (1+a) is the time needed to provide each time-unit of 
effective care.
4 The time constraints can then be written in the following way: 
 
(9) T0 = LS0  + L0 
(10) T1 = LS1 + L1  + (1+a)Z 
(11) T2 = LS2 + L2 
 
Finally, the income, Y, in the three periods can be written as follows, where we have 
substituted for labour supply, using the time constraint equations above: 
 
(12) Y0 = w(T0 – L0) 
                                                 
3 We assume that informal care is a perfect substitute to public or market care. In contrast, Kuhn and 
Nuscheler (2007) analyse the optimal public provision of nursing homes, and assumes that there may be a 
productivity difference between nursing homes and family care. In addition, they assume a fixed utility loss 
for parents when moving to nursing homes. 
4 Disregarding the time to travel, one unit of time is transferred into one unit of informal care. Thus, we 
assume that the productivity of informal care production is independent of the level of education of the 
caregiver. This is supported by Norwegian data (see, e.g., Romøren 2003; Gautun, 2003). 
  5(13) Y1 = w(T1 - L1 – (1+a)Z) 
(14) Y2 = w(T2 - L2) + M 
 
w is the wage rate and M is the inheritance the child receives after the death of the parent. 
  
We will now consider two versions of the model. In the first version, the child is rationed 
in the credit market, while in the second version there is a perfect credit market. 
 
3. An imperfect credit market  
Assume that the credit market is imperfect so that the child is not able to transfer money 
from one period to another. Thus we have the following budget constraints for the three 
periods, where P is the price of the consumption good and c is the monetary cost of 
providing care which may represent travel costs:
5 
 
(15) PX0 = Y0 
(16) PX1 + cZ = Y1 
(17) PX2 = Y2 
 
Period 0 
The optimisation problem of the child in period 0 is to maximise equation (5) with 
respect to X0, L0 given (12) and (15). 
 











                                                 
5 If c=0, X1 is a proxy of labour supply and income as all prices (P, w and a) are constant. In this case, 
U´´LX >0 also means that the productivity of leisure will increase in income, which is a sufficient condition 
for leisure to be a normal good. 
  6As seen, the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure should 
equal the relative price between consumption good and time. Together with the budget 
condition ((12) and (15)), this determines the optimal values of X0 and L0. 
 
Period 1 
The optimisation problem of the child in period 1 is to maximise equation (6) with 
respect to X1, L1 and Z given (8), (13) and (16). 
 





















Thus, the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure as well 
as consumption and caregiving should equal the relative price between these goods. 
While the price of leisure is a pure time cost, the price of care consists of both a time cost 
and a monetary cost. 
 













This means that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and caregiving should 
equal the relative difference in costs between these two alternatives. 
 
Equations (19), (20) and the budget condition given by (13) and (16) determine the 
optimal levels of consumption goods (X1), leisure (L1) and caregiving (Z) in period 1. 
Denote the optimal levels as X1
*, L1
* and Z
*. We then find  
  7 
(22) X1
*= X1
*(β, E,Z , T1, w, P, a, c) 
(23) L1
*= L1
*(β, E,Z , T1, w, P, a, c) 
(24) Z
*= Z
*(β, E,Z , T1, w, P, a, c) 
 
We will now study how changes in the education level (E), the wage rate (w), other 
caregiving (Z ) and travel costs (c and a) affect the optimal levels of these variables.
6 
 
A. A higher education level 
We first study an increase in the education level (E) for a constant wage rate. Here we do 
not consider a direct income effect from education, but we are able to study different 
behaviour of people with the same wage rate but different education level, i.e., the partial 
effect of education on caregiving. 
 
As u´´XE >0 and u´´LE >0, the marginal benefits from an increase in consuming the 
consumption good as well as leisure will increase. This gives two contradictory effects: 
First, this increases the marginal utility of consumption and leisure compared to 
caregiving.
7 This goes in the direction of less caregiving and more consumption and 
leisure. But there is a second contradictory effect. As the child gets a higher utility for a 
given amount of consumption or leisure, she does not need the same level of input of X 
and L for a given utility level. This goes in the direction of less purchase of the 
consumption good and less leisure. 
 
However, as seen from equations (19)-(21), the first effect dominates. As the child 
becomes more productive in producing the household consumption good, the MRS 
between the consumption good and caregiving (equation (20)) as well as the MRS 
between leisure and caregiving (equation (21)) have increased. Thus caregiving has to go 
                                                 
6 See Appendix B for more details. 
7 Alternatively, this can be interpreted as the child becomes more productive in producing total 
consumption, see equation  , than caregiving; the price of producing one unit of consumption goes down 
relative to the price of producing one unit of care 
(3)
  8down to restore the equilibrium. Under reasonable conditions,
8 the extra time (and 
money) from a reduction of caregiving will be spent on both working (and consumption) 
and leisure.  
 
Result 1: Caregiving is lower the higher the education level is. Under reasonable 
conditions, labour supply will increase in the education level, conditional on the wage 
rate.  
 
B. A higher wage rate 
An increase in the wage rate can also be thought of as an effect of education, but a 
different effect than the one studied above. Further, if there is a gender difference in the 
wage rate, this analysis may also explain parts of the gender difference. 
 
A higher wage increases the budget. This gives standard contradictory effects; the income 
and substitution effects. First, as the wage rate goes up, the child does not have to work as 
much as before to earn the same income, thus more time is available for leisure and 
caregiving. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of leisure and caregiving increases, 
which goes in the direction of higher labour supply. We find that the effects on labour 
supply and caregiving are indeterminate and we cannot tell which effect dominates. 
 
Result 2: We cannot in general tell the effect on labour supply and caregiving of a 
change in the wage rate.  
 
C. Higher exogenous caregiving 
An increase in Z  can be interpreted as a higher supply of informal
9 as well as formal or 
public care, but also as a change in the municipal organisation of care supply from home 
                                                 
8 This means that all extra time will not go to only one of the alternatives, which is reasonable as the 
marginal benefits of the different alternatives are falling. However, as the monetary cost of caregiving, cZ, 
goes down as Z falls, consumption will increase even if labour supply is constant. Hence, there is a 
possibility that labour supply does not increase. 
9 This can be interpreted as more siblings, but only under strict assumptions as more siblings does not 
necessary mean an increase in total caregiving, see footnote 1. 
  9care services to institutions as this may increase the total amount of care given to the 
parent. 
 
In general, higher public contributions may crowd out private contributions, see, e.g., 
Nyborg and Rege (2003). In our model, a higher Z  will increase the total amount of care 
received by the parent (N), everything else given. This will reduce the marginal utility of 
the parent from a unit of care; V´(N). Thus, the MRS between consumption and 
caregiving as well as between leisure and caregiving will increase; see equations (20) and 
(21). As a result, under reasonable conditions,
10 the child will increase its purchase of 
consumption goods, increase labour supply and leisure and reduce its caregiving. 
 
Result 3: An increase in public care will reduce informal caregiving and, under 




D. Higher travel costs 
Travel costs can either be time costs or monetary costs. Small (1992) finds that about two 
thirds of the costs of commuting are time costs, while only one third is a monetary cost. 
Time costs and monetary costs can have different effects on labour supply. The study by 
Cogan (1981) shows the effects of fixed costs associated with entry into the labour 
market. An increase in a monetary fixed cost will increase labour supply for those who 
continue to work, while an increase in the time cost will reduce hours of work among 
workers.  
 
A high a and/or c in our model can be interpreted as a longer geographical distance from 
the child to the parent. Note that this can be a further implication of education in addition 
to the analysis above, as children with higher education usually move further away from 
home compared to children with lower education. 
 
                                                 
10 See footnote 8. 
  10We first consider a higher monetary cost, c. Higher monetary travel costs increase the 
price of providing informal care and the supply of informal care goes down. Further, 




However, if the marginal utility of caregiving is sufficiently high, an increase in travel 
costs may actually lead to lower leisure.
12 The reason is that more labour should be 




Result 4: Higher monetary travel costs will under reasonable conditions reduce informal 
caregiving and increase leisure and labour supply 
 
Assume instead that travel costs are time costs. A rise in the time cost, a, implies that 
more time is required to provide a given level of care, which gives a reduction in labour 
supply and leisure. But, this also increases the price on informal care and leads to lower 
care provision. Even if the level of care provision is lower, the total time spent on care 
may be higher, and we cannot in general tell whether labour supply and leisure will 
increase. 
 
However, from Appendix B, we find that the effects of an increase in c and a on X1, L1 
and Z1 prove to be equal in this model.
14 Based on this we can compare the effects on 
labour supply in the two cases. Labour supply in period 1, LS1, is equal to T1-L1-(1+a)Z1. 
So an increase in a will have a direct negative effect on labour supply, an effect that is 
                                                 
11 Again, if the total monetary cost of caregiving, cZ, goes down, consumption will increase even if labour 
supply is constant, and there is a possibility that labour supply does not increase. But note that cZ does not 
necessary go down in this case as c increases.  
12 In Appendix B, equations (B34) and (B35), we find that X1 and L1 increases for V’’ sufficiently small. 
13 Note that as uXL > 0, lower consumption will reduce the marginal utility of leisure. Thus, if consumption 
goes down, leisure may be reduced, and there is a possibility that caregiving actually increase for a large 
value of uXL, see equation (B36) in Appendix B. 
14 In Appendix B, compare the set of equations (B31)-(B33) with the equations (B37)-(B39). For dc =wda, 
i.e., for a change in c equal to the monetary value of a change in a, the sets of equations are identical. 
  11not present for an increase in c.
15 As the effects on L1 and Z1 are equal for changes in a 
and c, we, therefore, see that labour supply will be lower for an increase in time costs 
compared to an increase in travel costs.
16 
 
Result 5: Higher time costs of care giving will under reasonable conditions reduce the 
level of informal caregiving but not necessary the time spent on caregiving. While the 
effects on leisure is the same as in the case with higher monetary travel costs, labour 
supply will be lower with higher time costs than higher monetary costs. 
 
Period 2 
In period 2, the parent has deceased and the child maximizes the utility function in 
equation (7), with respect to X2 and L2 given (14) and (17). 
 











Thus, as in period 1, the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and 
leisure should equal the relative price between consumption good and time. Together 
with the budget constraint, (14) and (17), this determines the optimal allocation of time 
between work and leisure, and the purchase of the consumption good. 
 
Note that in this period of time, X2 is not a proxy of income, as the child also has received 
an inheritance (M). However, for a given inheritance, a change in X2 is equal to a change 
in labour income. Also, for a constant available time, T2, an increase in leisure, L2, 
reduces working time. 
                                                 
15 Let LS1 denote labour supply in period 1. We then have dLS1 = dT1 – dL1 – (1+a)dZ1 – Z1da. The last 
term is negative for an increase in a. 
16 It may seem contraintuitive that labour supply is lower with an increase in time costs compared to an 
increase in monetary costs while consumption is the same, but the reason is that less of the income can be 
spent on consumption in the latter case. This can easily be seen from a total differentiation of equation (10), 
setting dc = wda. 
  12 
As the parent has deceased, the child receives an inheritance (M). Receiving an 
inheritance will have impacts on the optimal levels of work and leisure. We find that the 
child increases his leisure time.
17 An increase in leisure means a fall in time devoted to 
work and a fall in labour income.
18  
 
The intuition is as follows. A positive inheritance will increase the consumption 
possibilities of the child. This can be used to increase the purchase of consumption goods, 
increase time used for leisure or both. As time can only be used for work and leisure, 
devoting more time to leisure means a lower labour supply. Whether the child wants to 
reduce labour supply or not is dependent on the specification of the utility function. If 
more leisure and consumption are complementary in utility (u´´LX  > 0), the child wants 
to take out some of the wealth increase in leisure and reduce its labour supply. Note also 
that as the credit market is imperfect, the inheritance in period 2 does not affect labour 
supply in period 1.  
 
Result 6: With an imperfect credit market, the child will supply less labour in period 2 if 
there is an inheritance from the parent. 
 
The loss of a parent may also affect the health of the child in several ways. The child may 
be exhausted after a long period of nursing, or grief may reduce the ability to work. We 
interpret this as a reduction in healthy time, T2. As expected, in Appendix B we find that 
consumption goes down for a reduction in T2, which means that labour income has been 
reduced. 
 
Result 7: A reduction in available or healthy time in period 2 will reduce the labour 
supply of the child. 
                                                 
17 See Appendix B for comparative statistics on the second time period. 












 and the result depends on u´´LX  ≥ 0, which is a sufficient condition for leisure 
to be a normal good. 
  13 
A comparison of labour supply across periods 
Assume equal time budgets across periods 012 ( TTT ) = = . We can now compare the labour 
supply for the different periods. With credit constraints, we normally expect labour 
supply to decline from period 0 to period 1, as the reduction in available time for leisure 
and consumption is distributed between the two goods in order keep the marginal rate of 
substitution constant. However, if the monetary cost of care-giving c is sufficiently high 
as well as parent’s marginal utility of care, labour supply may actually increase in period 
1. In this case it would be optimal for the child to reduce leisure and increase labour 
supply in order to be able to provide the costly care. With credit constraints, the labour 
supply in period 2 is unequivocally lower than in period 0, since the inheritance entails an 
income effect raising both consumption and leisure in period 2. Compared to period 1, 
labour supply may rise or fall, depending on whether the removal of the care 




4. A perfect credit market 
As we saw above, an inheritance in period 2 does not affect the labour supply in period 1 
in an imperfect credit market. Even with a perfect credit market, inheritance in period 2 
may not have much influence on labour supply in period 1 if the size of the inheritance is 
uncertain. Thus, in this case we may obtain similar conclusions as in the analysis above. 
However, if there is a perfect credit market and no uncertainty about the size of the 
inheritance,
19 the child will take this into account when entering the labour market. The 
size of the inheritance will affect labour supply in all periods, but the labour market 
decision will not be affected by the timing of the inheritance.
20   
 
                                                 
19 E.g., the size of the inheritance is independent of the time of death. 
20 As there is a perfect credit market and the size of the inheritance is known, the time path will be time 
consistent and independent of the time of the death of the parent. 
  14As we only have three periods in the model, we can study how the labour supply in 
period 0 and 1 are affected by an inheritance in period 2 in a perfect credit market, when 
there is no uncertainty about the size of the inheritance. In the following, we disregard 
interest rates and discounting,
21 thus the intertemporal budget constraint of the child is: 
 
(26)    01 2 0 0 1 1 2 2 () ( ( 1 ) ) () pX pX cZ pX w T L w T L a Z w T L M ++ += − +− − + + − +
 
The child maximises the intertemporal utility function 
 
(27)   
2
0 t t UU
= =∑
 
with respect to X0, X1, X2, L0, L1, L2 and Z, given equations (5)-(8) and (26). 
 
The first order conditions from this optimisation problem are given by equations  
























We find that labour supply in period 0 and 1 is reduced for an increase of the 
inheritance.
22 The reason is that the child finds it optimal to spread the consumption of 
the inheritance over the three periods, as there are diminishing returns from consumption, 
and then does not need to work that much to be able to achieve the same consumption 
level. Consider for instance period 0. As seen from (18), consuming the inheritance for a 
                                                 
21 We can easily show that if the market interest rate is set equal to the discount rate, disregarding interest 
rates will not affect the first order conditions. 
22 We do not solve this analytically in an appendix as for the case with an imperfect credit market as this 
would be very time consuming. However, it is possible to interpret the first order conditions to find the 
solutions. 
  15given labour supply will reduce the MRS between consumption and leisure. In the new 
equilibrium, the child will therefore increase leisure and reduce labour supply. The 
intuition will be similar for period 1.   
 
A lower labour supply in period 1 means that more time is available for leisure and 
caregiving. Under reasonable conditions,
23 this extra time will be used on both 
alternatives. Thus, we get the result that the higher the inheritance, the more time is spent 
on caregiving, even if there are no strategic bequest motives. 
 
Result 8: In a perfect credit market with no uncertainty about the size of the inheritance, 
a higher inheritance will reduce the labour supply in period 0 and 1, and under 
reasonable assumptions increase informal caregiving. 
 
Assume equal time budgets across periods 012 ( TTT ) = = . We can now compare the labour 
supply for the different periods. In the absence of credit constraints and uncertainty, this 
model predicts labour supply to be lower in period 1 than in periods 0 and 2 (provided an 
interior solution to the optimization problem), as total time are spread over three activities 
in this period. Also, we find labour supply to be equal across the pre- and post-care 
periods, see (18), (25) and (29). 
 
Doing comparative statics on other exogenous variables such as E and w, would provide 
similar results found under the imperfect credit market. 
 
5. Possible extensions 
This model opens up for several analysis and extensions. One of the interesting aspects 
would be to study further the effects of inheritance. The model can be extended to include 
uncertainty for instance about the size of inheritance. We could also study the response to 
inheritance for, e.g., different levels of education and wage. Another extension is to study 
the age effect. The age of the child may matter for instance for the time budget 
(depending for instance on the age of its own children), marginal utilities and credit 
                                                 
23 See footnote 9. 
  16constraints. Strategic considerations are also not considered in this model. This could be 
considerations for giving care other than altruism, or strategic interactions among 
siblings. 
  17Appendix A: The optimisation problem 
 
1. Imperfect credit market 
 
Period 1 
The child wants to maximise  
(A1)  11 1 (, ; ) ( ) Uu X L E V Z Z β =+ +  
given  
(A2) PX1 +cZ= w(T1 – L1 – (1+a)Z) 
  
This gives the following Lagrangian: 
(A3)  11 1 1 1 1 1 (, ; ) ( ) ( ( ( 1 ) ) ) per Lu X L EV Z Z w T L a Z P X c Z βλ =+ + + − − + − −  
 
















































(( 1 ) )
per L
wT L aZ P X c Z
λ
∂





(A8)   
''
XL wu Pu =
(A9) 
'' (( 1 ) ) LN wa c uw V β ++ =  
(A10)    11 1 (( 1 ) ) wT L aZ P X c Z −−+ − − = 0
 
Equations (A8)-(A10) determine X1, L1 and Z. 
 
  18The second order conditions can be written as follows (see, e.g., Varian, 1992): 
(A11)   
2' ' ' ' ' ' (2 ) LL XX LX Pu ww u P u −− − ≡ Λ > 0
0
)
(A12)   
2 '' 2 '' '' '' 2 '' '' 2 '' (( 1 ) ) [ ( ) ] ( 2 ) LX LL XX NN LL LX XX cw a u u u V P u P w u w u β ++ − − − + ≡ Δ <
 
While (A11) is fulfilled, (A12) requires 
 
2 '' 2 '' '' '' 2 '' '' 2 '' (( 1 ) ) [ ( ) ] ( 2 LX LL XX NN LL LX XX cw a u u u V P u P w u w u β ++ − < − +
 
Period 2 
The child wants to maximise  
(A13) U2 = u(X2,L2;E) 
given  
(A14) PX2 = w(T2 - L2) + M 
 
This gives the following Lagrangian: 
(A15)  22 2 2 2 2 (, ; ) ( ( ) ) per Lu X L E w T L M P X 2 λ =+ − + −  
 















































(A19)   
''
XL wu Pu =
(A20)    22 2 () wT L M P X −+ − =
 
Equations (A19) and (A20) determine X2 and L2. 
  19 
The second order condition can be written as follows (note that this is the same as (A11)): 
 
(A21)   
2' ' ' ' ' ' (2 ) LL XX LX Pu ww u P u −− − ≡ Λ > 0
 
  20Appendix B: Total differentiation 
 
1. Imperfect credit market – period 1 




* given exogenous values of E,Z , T1, w, P, a and c: 
 
(B1)   
'' 0 XL wu Pu −=
(B2)   
'' (( 1 ) ) 0 LN wa c u w V β ++ − =
(B3) PX1 +cZ – w(T1 - L1 – (1+a)Z) = 0 
 
A total differentiation of the system (B1)-(B3) gives: 
(B4)   
' '' '' '' ' '' '' ''









ud w a w d ad c w a cud X ud L ud E
Vd w wV d Z d Z ββ
++ + + ++ + +
−− + =
' ' ' '




(( 1 ) )
(( 1 ) ) 0
X dP PdX cdZ Zdc T L a Z dw
wd T d L ad Z Z d a




This can be written in the following way: 
(B7)   
' ' '' '' '' '' '' ''
11 () ( ) () X L XX LX XL LL XE LE u dw u dP wu Pu dX wu Pu dL wu Pu dE −+ − + − + − = 0
(B8) 
'' ' ' '
11
'' ' '' ''
( ( 1) ) ( ( 1)) ( ( 1))
(( 1 ) ) 0
LN L L X
LE L NN NN
u a V dw u dc w a c u dX w a c u dL
w a c u dE u wda w V dZ w V dZ
β
ββ
+− + + ++ + ++





(B9)   
()
11 1 1 1 (( 1 ) )
(1 ) 0
X dP PdX Zdc T L Z a dw wdT wdL
wa c d Z Z w d a
++ − − − + −+
++ + + =
 
A. dE > 0, dZ = dT1 = dw = dP = dc = da = 0 
(B7)-(B9) reduce to: 
 
(B10)   
'' '' '' '' '' ''
11 () ( ) () XX LX XL LL XE LE wu Pu dX wu Pu dL wu Pu dE −+ − + − 0 =
(B11)   
'' '' '' ''
11 (( 1 ) ) (( 1 ) ) (( 1 ) ) 0 LX LL LE NN w a c u dX w a c u dL w a c u dE w V dZ β ++ + ++ + ++ − =






2' '' ' ' '' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
1 (( 1 ) ) [ ] ( ) LEL X L LX E N N X E L E
dX K
dE
Kc w a u u u uw V w u P u β
=
Δ
=− + + − + −
 
  
Note that Δ < 0, see (A12). 
 
We know from the first order condition (B1) that . Thus,  
'







XE LE wU PU =
 
Using this, we find: 
 
(B15)   
2' ' ' ' ' '' '














2' ' ' ' ' '' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
2 (( 1 ) ) [ ] ( ) LXX E L EX X N N L E X E
dL K
dE
Kc w a u u u uP V P u w u β
=
Δ
=− + + − + −
 
 
Using (B14), we find 
 
  22(B17)   
2' ' ' ' ' ' ' '














'' '' '' '' '' '' '' ''
3 ( (1 ))[ ) 0
=
Δ
=+ + − + − > LE LX LL XE LX XE LE XX
K dZ
dE











B. dw > 0, dE =dZ = dT1 = dP = dc = da = 0 
(B7)-(B9) reduce to: 
 
(B19)   
'' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
11 () ( ) XX X L X X L L L ud w w u P u d X w u P u d L +− +− = 0
(B20)   
' ' '' '' ''
11 (( 1 ) ) ( ( 1 ) ) ( ( 1 ) ) 0 LN L X L L N N uaV d w w a c u d X w a c u d L w V d Z ββ +− + ++ + ++ − =




(B22)  () {}
()
14
2 '' ' ' '' ' '' '' ' ' '' ''
4
'' 2 ' '' '
11
2' ' ' 2'' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
1
(1 ) 2 ( )
( 1) [( ( 1) ) ( 1) ]
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( (1 )
LL X L LL L LX LL X N LX LL
LL L NN N
LL X L LX X NN LX N NN
dX K
dw
Kc U U a c P U U w U U w U U c V w U P U
w
PU a U V Z a L T a V






=+ + − + +−
++ + + + − − +
++ − + + + + − + + () ( ) 11 T ⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦
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2 '' ' ' '' ' '' '' ' ' '' ''
5
2'' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
11
2' ' ' ' ' 2' ' '
11
1
(1 ) 2 ( )
(1 ) ( (1 ) ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1
LX X L LX L XX LX X N XX LX
LL X X N N L X N N N
LX X XX L NN
dL K
dw
Kc U U a c P U U w U U w U U c V w U P U
w
Pa U U U V U V Z a L T a V







=+ + − + +−
⎡⎤ ++ + + + + − − + ⎣⎦
++ − + + + + − − ()
' ) N aV ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
 
 
(B24)  () () () { }
() ( ) ()
6
2 ' '' ' ' ' ' ' ' '' '
6
'' 2 '' '' '' '
11 11
'' ' ' ''
1
( 1) ( 1)2 ( 1) 2
( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( ( 1) )
(1 )
LL L N X LL L LX LX N
LX XX LL LX X
XX L N XX
dZ K
dw
KP Ua U V P U U c w a w a U U w U V
w
w a c U La Z T U U La Z T U U






=+ − ++ + − + +




K4, K5 and K6 are indeterminate. 
 
C. dZ  > 0, dE = dT1 = dw = dP = dc = da = 0 
(B7)-(B9) reduce to: 
 
(B25)   
'' '' '' ''
11 () ( ) XX LX XL LL wu Pu dX wu Pu dL −+ − 0 =
(B26) 
'' '' '' ''
11 (( 1 ) ) (( 1 ) ) 0 LX LL NN NN w a c u dX w a c u dL w V dZ w V dZ ββ ++ + ++ − − =  








7 (1 ) ( ) 0
=
Δ
=− + + − < NN LL LX
K dX
dZ
Ka w c V P U w U β
 












8 (1 ) ( ) 0 NN XX LX
dL K
dZ
Kw a c V w U P U β
=
Δ













'' 2 '' '' 2 ''
9 (2 ) NN LL LX XX
K dZ
dZ
KV P U w P Uw U β
=
Δ











D. dc > 0, dE = dZ = dT1 = dw = dP = da = 0 
(B7)-(B9) reduce to: 
 
(B31)   
'' '' '' ''
11 () ( ) XX LX XL LL wu Pu dX wu Pu dL −+ − 0 =
' '
N N (B32)   
'' ' ' '
11 (( 1 ) ) (( 1 ) ) 0 LL X L L ud c w a cu d X w a cu d L w V d Z β ++ + ++ + − =




  25(B34) 
()
10 1
'' '' ' ''
10
K
() ( ( 1 ) )
=
Δ
=− + + + LLL X L N
dX
dc






'' '' ' ''
11 () ( ( 1 ) )
=
Δ
=− + + + XX LX L NN
dL K
dc






2 ' '' ' '' ' '' '' 2 '' ''
12 2( ) ( ( LL L LL X LX X L X L LX X
K dZ
dc
K PUU w P UU ww UU U U U w a cZ
=
Δ
=− − + + − + + 1 ) )
 
 
K10, K11 and K12 are indeterminate. 
 
E. da > 0, dE = dZ = dT1 = dw = dP = dc = 0 
(B7)-(B9) reduce to: 
 
(B37)   
'' '' '' ''
11 () ( ) XX LX XL LL wu Pu dX wu Pu dL −+ − 0 =
(B38)   
'' '' ' ''
11 (( 1 ) ) (( 1 ) ) 0 LX LL L NN w a c u dX w a c u dL u wda w V dZ β ++ + ++ + − =







'' '' ' ''
13 10 () ( ( 1 ) ) LL LX L NN
K dX dX
da dc
KP U w U U w a c Z w V K β
== −
Δ
=− + + + =
 




'' '' ' ''
14 11 () ( ( 1 ) ) XX LX L NN
dL K dL
da dc
Kw UP U U w a c Z w V K β
==
Δ






2 ' '' ' '' ' '' '' 2 '' ''
15 12 (2 ( ) ( 1 ) LL L LL X LX X L X L LX X
K dZ dZ
da dc
K P U U wPU U w wU U U U U w a c Z K
==
Δ
=− − + + − + + =
 
 
K13, K14 and K15 are indeterminate. 
 
2. Imperfect credit market – period 2 
In period 2, the equations (A19) and (A20) give the optimal variables X2
*, L2
* given 
exogenous values of E, T2, w, P and M: 
 
(B43)   
'' 0 XL wu Pu −=
(B44) PX2 – w(T2 – L2) – M = 0 
 
A total differentiation of the system (B44) and (B45) gives: 
(B45)   
' ' '' '' '' '' '' ''
22 () ( ) () X L XX LX XL LL XE LE u dw u dP wu Pu dX wu Pu dL wu Pu dE −+ − + − + − = 0
0 (B46)    22 2 2 2 2 () X dP PdX T L dw wdT wdL dM +− − −+− =
 
A. dM > 0, dE= dw = dT2 = dP = 0 
(B45)-(B46) reduce to: 
 
(B47)   
'' '' '' ''
22 () ( ) XX LX XL LL wu Pu dX wu Pu dL −+ − 0 =
(B48)    22 0 PdX wdL dM +− =
 

















  (B50) 
 
where Λ follows from (A21). 
 
B. dT2 > 0, dE= dw = dP = dM = 0 
45)-(B46) reduce to: 
''
































  (B54) 
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